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PREFACE: INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR VS.
EMPLOYEE AND BLACKWATER
Charlie Cromwell
Military Law Society
The Military Law Society at The University of Montana School of
Law seeks to educate law students and the legal community on current is-
sues in military justice. At previous events and symposia, we have ex-
plored a variety of topics, including: "Don't Ask Don't Tell" and homosex-
uality in the military, formation of the Iraqi justice system, trying cases in a
combat zone, detainee tribunals at Guantanamo Bay, and careers in the JAG
Corps. I In this tradition, our organization and the Montana Law Review are
honored to introduce Robert Wood's article, Independent Contractor vs.
Employee and Blackwater. Mr. Wood's article examines one of the many
issues arising from America's proliferated use of private contractors in war-
time.
According to a 2008 Congressional Budget Office report, there are
now as many private contractors in Iraq as there are soldiers-190,000 at
last count.2 This 1:1 ratio is unprecedented in the history of American war-
fare.3 Unsurprisingly, such a profound change in our government's ap-
proach to war has led to many unforeseen consequences. Mr. Wood's arti-
cle examines a labor-taxation issue, while other areas of concern include: an
absence of legal accountability for contractors' criminal behavior,4 a lack of
military command and control over contractors, 5 an exodus of military per-
sonnel seeking private contractors' high wages and autonomy in combat
zones, 6 ballooning taxpayer obligations to private contractors in Iraq-
some $85 billion to date,7 and the fraud or waste that invariably occurs with
little military or government oversight.8
1. For more information, please visit our website at: www.umt.edu/law/students/orgs/militarylaw
society/ (last updated Feb. 2009).
2. Congressional Budget Office, Contractor's Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq 1, 8, www.cbo.
gov/ftpdocs/96xx/doc9688/08-12-IraqContractors.pdf (Aug. 2008) [hereinafter Congressional Budget
Office Report].
3. Id. at 12.
4. Id. at 23.
5. Id. at 20.
6. U.S. News & World Rpt., Big Demand for a Very Specialized Set of Skills, www.usnews.coml
articles/news/iraq/2007/10/05/big-demand-and-big-pay-for-security-contractors.htmI (posted Oct. 5,
2007).
7. Congressional Budget Office Report, supra n. 2, at 2.
8. See generally U.S. Govt. Accountability Off., Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Conditions in
Iraq are Conducive to Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07525t.pdf (Apr. 23,
2007).
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As a Bradley platoon leader and contracting officer in Iraq, I witnessed
these issues manifest first-hand. In one instance, the Army's Criminal In-
vestigation Division charged several soldiers and private contractors on our
base with trafficking narcotics. To many of us, it seemed unfair that the
soldiers were sentenced to prison in Kuwait while the private contractors
were simply sent home. I observed hundreds of thousands of dollars paid
out in cash for construction or service contracts that were typically over-
priced, incomplete, or unnecessary. Many of my soldiers were visibly frus-
trated that most U.S. contractors were making 3 or 4 times their salaries 9
and were not beholden to many of the orders and rules imposed on military
service members. Unlike soldiers, for example, contractors often drank al-
cohol, did not have to abide by the same uniform standards, and had more
days of leave to visit their families at home. Therefore, I was not surprised
when several of my former soldiers decided to forego reenlistment and join
private contracting firms after leaving the Army.
Nevertheless, in spite of various criticisms, the wars we fight could not
be won without private contractors. Indeed, since the Revolutionary War,
our country has contracted with private industry to fill gaps in military ca-
pability.10 Robert Morris, the financier of the American Revolution, noted:
In all countries engaged in war, experience has sooner or later pointed out that
contracts with private men of substance and understanding are necessary for
the subsistence, covering, clothing, and moving of any Army.'1
To date, however, the United States has never utilized private contrac-
tors to this extent. As is typically the case when employing a new strategy,
unforeseen consequences arise. While private contractors' wartime mis-
sions are critical, they should not receive contractual carte blanche to
achieve them. The American people should demand that private industry in
wartime conduct itself just like military commanders. Contractors must not
forget that their ultimate obligation is not the acquisition of wealth, but
rather contributing to the American war effort. Mr. Wood's article brings to
light a novel concern worthy of discussion, and the Military Law Society
hopes such issues continue to be addressed in a similar fashion.
Charlie Cromwell
Captain, U.S. Army
Iraq War Veteran
Military Law Society Member
The University of Montana School of Law
www.umt.edu/law/students/orgs/militarylawsociety/
9. Congressional Budget Office Report, supra n. 2, at 14.
10. Id. at 12.
11. Dept. of the Army, Contractor Deployment Guide 715-716, Preface, http://www.army.mil/
usapa/epubs/pdf/p715_16.pdf (Feb. 27, 1998).
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INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR VS. EMPLOYEE
AND BLACKWATER
Robert W. Wood*
I. INTRODUCTION
In our endless 24-hour news cycle, most Americans have heard the
term "private contractors" in relation to American military and security op-
erations in Iraq. Since the first Gulf War in 1990, government-contract
work (primarily the reconstruction of buildings and infrastructure) has only
escalated. Given the significant presence of the United States, we seem to
have new industries and nomenclature emerging. Today, most of us are
familiar in some vague way with the notion that, not only is Iraq peopled
with American service personnel, but also with private American contrac-
tors.
The question I want to address is whether one group of those private
contractors are: (1) independent contractors, and thus free agents from an
employment law and tax perspective; or (2) employees of the company that
sends them to Iraq and gives them their daily orders. The term "contrac-
tors" can be confusing in this context, since ostensibly it means only a pri-
vate person or private company contracting with the U.S. government.
Many people may not realize, however, that such contractors include mili-
tary contractors that do not provide consulting, construction, or infrastruc-
ture work, but instead provide military or quasi-military services.
In short, someone dressed like a soldier, armed like a soldier, and car-
rying on activities like a soldier, may not actually be in the service of the
U.S. armed forces. Such a soldier may be a private contractor, or perhaps
more accurately, may be working in some capacity for a company that has a
contract with the U.S. government. There are three private companies
under contract with the U.S. government to provide "security" services in
Iraq. The largest and most well-known of these is Blackwater Worldwide,
an organization that some refer to as the fifth branch of the U.S. armed
forces.' Over the last several years there has been considerable debate
* Robert W. Wood practices law with Wood & Porter, in San Francisco (www.woodporter.com),
and is the author of Taxation of Damage Awards and Settlement Payments (3d Ed. Tax Institute 2005
with 2008 Update) available at www.damageawards.org. This discussion is not intended as legal advice,
and cannot be relied upon for any purpose without the services of a qualified professional.
1. See Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenar
, 
Army (Na-
tion Books 2007).
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about the role private contracting should play in the U.S. military theater.
There have even been Congressional hearings regarding these debates. 2
This article does not intend to contribute to the debate about the merits
and demerits of privatizing such operations or to the degree of oversight the
U.S. government should have over such functions. Instead, this article fo-
cuses on a discrete but important issue: whether soldiers (called "security
guards") working for Blackwater Worldwide can do so as independent con-
tractors (as they are now treated by Blackwater), or whether they must be
viewed as Blackwater employees. The federal government has also looked
into this question, although the point has not been resolved. It is unclear
whether the investigation is even proceeding.
At the outset, it is necessary to clarify some unfortunate and poten-
tially confusing nomenclature. Referring to Blackwater and other security
companies as "private contractors" should not necessarily bear on the ques-
tion of whether its workers are independent contractors. A private contrac-
tor to the U.S. government might have-as indeed Blackwater does-both
its own employees and independent contractors.
Most private security companies-or any other kind of government
contractor-who are expecting to be paid by the federal government, pre-
sumably have contracts with the federal government. Such companies also
may have contracts with their own workers, such as employment contracts
or independent contractor contracts. One does not necessarily bear on the
other.
The contract between worker and company may be called a service
agreement, an independent contractor agreement, a consulting agreement,
or any one of several other titles. A consulting contract is one of the tradi-
tional labels applied to services intended to be independent. Generally, the
only certainty is that a contract intended to qualify as an independent con-
tractor agreement will not be titled as an "employment agreement."
II. EMPLOYEE VS. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR FUNDAMENTALS
The distinction between independent contractors and employees may
seem self-evident. The difference between hiring an independent worker
for a one-time project and hiring an employee for whom you take payroll
deductions for federal income tax withholding and employment taxes may
seem straightforward. Although the consequences of hiring one or the other
may be marked, the line between these two classes of workers is not. The
distinction is often difficult to discern, as the line between employee and
independent contractor is a subtle one. Disputes over misclassification are
2. For examples of Congressional hearings regarding private contracting in the military arena,
consult infra nn. 20, 26, and accompanying text.
Vol. 70
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common. Unquestionably, however, the legal consequences between en-
gaging independent contractors and employing employees are enormous.
An employer must withhold income and employment taxes from em-
ployee wages and pay them to the IRS. This entails significant financial,
administrative, and reporting obligations. An employer is also responsible
for withholding and paying over state income tax, in a system that, like the
federal treatment, involves costs and legal responsibilities. Social Security
or Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and Medicare withholdings
are required on all wages, with a cap on the FICA withholding.3
The employer and the employee each pay half of these taxes. The
Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) allows for the collection of a fed-
eral employer tax used to fund state workforce agencies.4 Employers are
responsible for paying workers' compensation insurance premiums for em-
ployees to ensure benefits are available to employees injured on the job.5
Generally, only employees are entitled to medical and retirement bene-
fits, and their costs, both administrative and reporting duties can be substan-
tial. Qualified pensions and other employee benefit plans are generally
available and/or required only for employees. Employers must generally
pay business expenses incurred by their employees in the course and scope
of their employment. Under respondeat superior, an employer is responsi-
ble for the torts of employees committed in the course and scope of their
duties. The possibility of such liabilities represents an enormous potential
cost of having employees.
In contrast to this litany of costs and responsibilities for employees,
when an employer hires an independent contractor, the employer escapes all
of these problems and costs. This is the core issue behind many, if not
most, worker characterization disputes. Some evidence suggests that
worker characterization disputes are on the rise, not only with governmental
entities hungry for tax revenues, but also in civil litigation between private
parties.
The process of attempting to classify a worker involves few bright-line
tests. In large part, determining whether a worker is an employee or an
independent contractor involves a subjective analysis, even though the cri-
teria may appear objective. Such a determination often involves analyzing
a web of various factors, weighted in a manner that is not prescribed by
law. Although some factors are more important than others, precisely how
one weighs the various factors falls under one of the many subjective ele-
ments of worker status classification.
3. I.R.C. §§ 3101-3102, 3111 (2007).
4. Id. at § 3301.
5. Id.
2009
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In some cases, the inquiry not only involves whether the worker is an
employee or an independent contractor, but a secondary inquiry about the
identity of the employer. Assuming the worker is an employee, one can
question precisely which company is the employer. Federal laws-both tax
laws as well as labor and employment laws-are relevant, as are state laws.
State laws, however, vary.
Moreover, the emergence of third-party companies intended to shoul-
der the employer status must also be considered. Such staffing companies
may have employees whom they loan or lease out to other firms. In some
cases, there can even be hybrids, where a staffing firm is the employer for a
particular worker for employment tax purposes, but not for purposes of em-
ployee benefits. Temporary employees, leased employees, and workers
provided by contract firms all complicate the jumble of factors to be consid-
ered.
Recently, it was reported that Blackwater Worldwide, the scandal-
plagued defense contractor, may have misclassified its workers. 6 That story
blossomed, provoking considerable Congressional concern over Blackwater
and worker classification issues. Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts
wrote to Senate Finance Committee Chairs Max Baucus and Chuck
Grassley, the U.S. Small Business Administration, and even to the head of
Blackwater, Erik Prince. 7 Senators Barack Obama and Richard Durbin
drafted a Senate bill to address independent contractor issues8 and more
recently wrote Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson.9 Much of the concern
relates to the loss of tax revenues that hiring independent contractors en-
tails.
Quite apart from tax issues, Blackwater has faced controversy and crit-
icism over the actions of its contractors in Iraq, the deaths of some of its
contractors, and the allegedly unprovoked killing of 17 Iraqi civilians in
Baghdad in September 2007.10 In addition, Blackwater now faces queries
as to whether its security personnel in Iraq are employees."1
6. Elizabeth Olson, Auditors Question Blackwater Contracts, N.Y. Times C5 (Aug. 12, 2008).
7. Senator John Kerry, Kerry Requests Finance Investigation of Blackwater, 2007 Tax Notes To-
day 209-268 (Oct. 29, 2007); Senator John Kerry, Kerry Asks SBA for Blackwater Documentation, 2007
Tax Notes Today 206-246 (Oct. 24, 2007); Senator John Kerry, Kerry Requests SBA-Related Documen-
tation From Blackwater, 2007 Tax Notes Today 209-270 (Oct. 29, 2007).
8. Sen. 2044, Independent Contractor Proper Classification Act of 2007, 11 0th Cong. (Sept. 12,
2007) (as introduced).
9. Senators Barack Obama & Richard Durbin, Obama, Durbin Say Blackwater Case Shows Need
for Tax Law Reform, 2007 Tax Notes Today 212-229 (Nov. 1, 2007).
10. Del Quentin Wilber & Karen DeYoung, Justice Dept. Moves Toward Charges Against Con-
tractors in Iraq Shooting, Wash. Post A01 (Aug. 17, 2007).
11. August Cole, Politics and Economics: Blackwater Assailed on Tax Policy-Firm Calls Iraq
Guards Independent Contractors; Waxman Seeks Review, Wall St. J. A14 (Dec. 3, 2007).
Vol. 70
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III. BLACKWATER BACKGROUND
Blackwater Security Consulting LLC ("Blackwater" or "the com-
pany"), an affiliate of Blackwater Worldwide, has been providing private
security services to the U.S. government since 2002.12 Blackwater was
founded in 1997, initially envisioned as a basic training facility to support
the needs of local and regional law enforcement personnel. 13 According to
Blackwater's website, Blackwater's corporate vision extends much further
today, "empowering a talented collection of seasoned professionals from a
wide range of disciplines, directing them to develop cost-efficient and oper-
ationally-effective solutions for the U.S. government and other clientele." 14
Blackwater touts it ability to integrate four core competencies: ad-
vanced training, logistics/mobility, technology/innovation, and human/ma-
terial resources. Blackwater states that it is one of the world's most suc-
cessful security services corporations, providing creative solutions for the
United States government. 15 With respect to human resources, Blackwater
asserts that it has a "highly qualified team of experienced professionals, and
a thorough understanding how a scarcity of key resources can adversely
affect the successful execution of an extended operation." 1 6
Interestingly, with respect to its personnel, Blackwater's website states
that it recruits highly qualified and highly skilled personnel. The discussion
continues, stating:
The company looks for people of the utmost caliber; accountability, integrity
and respectability are requirements for a Blackwater Worldwide hire . .
Blackwater presently employs a wealth of experts, many of whom have previ-
ously served their country in the United States military or law enforcement.
Their experience and honorable past service make them the kind of employ-
ees Blackwater Worldwide looks for-qualified, skilled, and trustworthy.17
It is unclear in this discussion if Blackwater is describing solely its own
employees or its independent contractors as well. If Blackwater intends its
statements to apply to all Blackwater personnel-regardless of their status
as independent contractors or employees vis-A-vis Blackwater-this may
suggest that Blackwater treats all of its personnel in a similar fashion. That
12. Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army 1, 229
(Nation Books 2007).
13. Blackwater Worldwide, Company Profile, http://www.blackwaterusa.com/company-profile/
comp-history.html (last accessed Dec. 22, 2008).
14. Id.
15, Id.
16. Blackwater Worldwide, Human and Material Resources, http://www.blackwaterusa.com
humanresources/HMRhmn-rsourcs-overview.html (last accessed Dec. 22, 2008).
17. Blackwater Worldwide, Human and Material Resources, Recruit Highly Skilled Personnel,
http://www.blackwaterusa.comlhuman-resources/HMR-Recruit_personnel.html (last accessed Dec. 22,
2008).
2009
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could potentially bear on the bona fides of the characterization. However,
this point is certainly not expressed on Blackwater's website.
IV. BLACKWATER CONTRACT
In August 2004, Blackwater entered into a Worldwide Personal Pro-
tective Services II Contract ("the U.S. Contract") with the U.S. govern-
ment.' 8 The agreement called for Blackwater, along with two other private
military contractors, DynCorp and Triple Canopy, to provide security ser-
vices to the State Department in Iraq. 19
Andrew Howell, Blackwater's general counsel, testified at the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform's first hearing on Black-
water's activities in Iraq. 20 On March 30, 2007, the IRS sent a Form SS-8
Determination Letter to Blackwater regarding a former security guard who
requested clarification from the Internal Revenue Service on his status as
employee or independent contractor.2 1 The IRS ruled that the guard was
truly an employee and not an independent contractor.22 The Committee
sent additional requests for information on May 7, 2007, and May 10, 2007.
On May 15, 2007, Blackwater submitted a request for reconsideration. 23
On June 6, 2007, Blackwater executed a "Settlement and Mutual Re-
lease Agreement" with the former guard who had requested status clarifica-
tion, agreed to give him back-pay, and prohibited him from disclosing in-
formation about Blackwater. 24 Meanwhile, the Oversight Committee's in-
formational requests sent to Blackwater in May 2007 met resistance. On
August 3, 2007, the Oversight Committee issued a subpoena duces tecum to
compel Blackwater to provide documents. 25 On October 2, 2007, Erik
Prince-Blackwater's founder and chairman, who now heads Blackwater's
parent company, The Prince Group-testified before the House Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform. 26 The Committee questioned
Prince about Blackwater's treatment of its security personnel. 27
18. Id.
19. Rep. Waxman, Waxman Requests Information on Blackwater Tax Evasion, 2007 Tax Notes
Today 206-245 (Oct. 24, 2007).
20. H. R. Comm. on Oversight & Govt. Reform, Iraqi Reconstruction: Reliance on Private Militar
,
Contractors and Status Report, 110th Cong. 123 (Feb. 7, 2007).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Waxman, supra n. 19.
25. Id.
26. H. R. Comm. on Oversight & Govt. Reform, Hearing on Black iater USA, 110th Cong. 35
(Oct. 2, 2007).
27. Id.
Vol. 70
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A few weeks later, on October 22, 2007, Representative Henry Wax-
man, a Democrat from California and the chairperson of the House Over-
sight and Government Reform Committee, wrote to Erik Prince, acknowl-
edging the receipt of Blackwater's documents. 28 Waxman requested any
further documents or correspondence between Blackwater and federal offi-
cials relating to worker classification issues, documents relating to the
IRS's March 2007 ruling, documents relating to the nondisclosure agree-
ment, a list of personnel hired as independent contractors with descriptions
of their positions, employment data, amounts paid, and amounts withheld
and paid to the IRS. 29 Blackwater responded with a brief press release the
same day and a lengthier press release on December 3, 2007.30
V. EMPLOYEES OR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS?
Blackwater classifies over 500 U.S. workers as employees, including
secretaries, paralegals, information-technology professionals, accountants,
and landscapers. 3' The company also has workers in other countries, con-
sisting of veterans of specialized military who are hired by Blackwater to
work for several months at a time. Blackwater says these workers are sub-
ject to the "control, supervision, standards, and protocols of the U.S. gov-
ernment. ' 32 In contrast to its domestic workers, whom Blackwater treats as
employees, Blackwater has always classified its overseas security personnel
as independent contractors.
The contract between Blackwater and the State Department requires
Blackwater to maintain control over "the training, equipping, and the con-
duct of its security guards," both before being sent abroad and during their
work in a foreign country. 33 The contract requires Blackwater to "establish
training facilities, submit detailed training plans, and ensure that all security
personnel have 'successfully completed'" a certain number of hours of spe-
cialized training before being sent abroad.34 Furthermore, the company
must maintain that level of training throughout each guard's tenure, and the
guards are not allowed to use their own training methods. 35
Blackwater must ensure that its security guards follow precise direc-
tions, including standard operating procedures and orders issued by the
28. Waxman, supra n. 19.
29. Id.
30. Blackwater Worldwide, Blackwater Details Arguments Against Waxman Evasion Allegations,
2007 Tax Notes Today 233-326 (Dec. 4. 2007).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Waxman, supra n. 19.
34. Id.
35. Id.
2009
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State Department. Once in Iraq, the contract requires Blackwater to provide
its personnel with logistical support, equipment, and supplies, and addition-
ally prohibits them from "carrying or using their own weapons." 36 Black-
water is further required to provide food, shelter, laundry, and housekeeping
services for its guards.37
In addition to the demanding training and extensive screening of
Blackwater security personnel, Blackwater also disciplines its workforce.
Blackwater outfits its workers with body armor, uniforms, and boots, and
provides them with a handbook as well.38 If Blackwater personnel fail to
follow instructions or commit even minor infractions, such as having bad
attitudes or using a bike that does not belong to them, they are fired.39
Blackwater requires security personnel to sign a service contract,
which designates the security personnel as independent contractors. 40 The
service contract requires the contractor to pay all taxes and fees due the
government, designates travel expenses as taxable income, and provides
that no personal expenses will be reimbursed. 4 1 In addition, the service
contract sets the hours of each work day and specifies the contractor's start
date, where he reports for duty, where he will be stationed, and how he will
be compensated.4 2 Blackwater provides equipment, weapons, and transpor-
tation, but allows the contractor to bring personal equipment subject to
Blackwater's prior approval. 43
The service contract prohibits providing services to any other company
without prior written consent from Blackwater. 44 The contract provides
that the individual will report directly to Blackwater supervisors, leaders, or
the "Customer," and perform duties in accordance with Blackwater's rules
and regulations. 45 The contractor is further required to follow Blackwater
policies in relation to personal attire and hygiene. 46 The contractor agrees
to perform assigned duties until released by the Blackwater supervisor.4 7
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. H. R. Comm. on Oversight & Govt. Reform, supra n. 26, at 57.
40. Blackwater Security Consulting, Independent Contractor Service Agreement 1, 2 (unpublished
contract, Mar. 16, 2004) (copy on file with U. of Mont. L. Rev.).
41. Id. at 5-6.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 4-5.
44. Id. at 3.
45. Id. at 8.
46. Blackwater Security Consulting, Independent Contractor Service Agreement 1, 8 (unpublished
contract, Mar. 16, 2004) (copy on file with U. of Mont. L. Rev.).
47. Id.
Vol. 70
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The contract gives Blackwater the right to terminate the contract without
notice or cause for "any reason or no reason whatsoever." 48
In early 2007, a Blackwater security guard who worked in Afghanistan
in 2005 sought back-pay and requested clarification of his status from an
IRS office in Vermont. 49 On March 30, 2007, the IRS ruled he was an
employee. 50 The IRS called Blackwater's "independent contractor" classi-
fication "without merit." 51 While this ruling applied only to one security
guard, the IRS warned that its ruling might "be applicable to any other
individuals engaged by the firm under similar circumstances. '52
The IRS found the actual working relationship determinative, not the
written designation of the worker as an "independent contractor." 53 The
IRS found several factors pertinent:
" Blackwater had its personnel sign a written agreement to provide services,
and the agreement explained the "type of work and work rotation, and that
the worker's services were an essential part of the services that the firm
offers its clients";
" To protect its financial investment, Blackwater retained the rights to
"'change the worker's methods" and to direct the worker;
" Blackwater required the worker to personally perform the services for its
client;
" Blackwater paid the worker's travel expenses;
• Blackwater "performed an evaluation and had the right to suspend the
worker" for any procedural violations;
• The worker followed instructions regarding his assignment from the cli-
ent;
" The worker had no opportunity to realize a profit or incur a loss because
the worker did not invest capital or assume any risk; and
" Rather than being engaged in an independent enterprise, the services per-
formed were essential to Blackwater's client who looked to Blackwater to
provide a pool of workers with specific skills.54
Blackwater required the guard who had queried the IRS to sign a non-
disclosure agreement before he was given his back-pay and other compen-
sation. 55 The agreement prohibited the guard from "disclosing information
about Blackwater to any 'politician' or 'public official.' ",56 Representative
Waxman characterized the disclosure agreement as an attempt to conceal
48. Id. at 11.
49. Dana Hedgpeth, Waxman: Blackwater May Owe Back Taxes, Wash. Post DOI (Oct. 23, 2007).
50. Waxman, supra n. 19.
51. Id,
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Waxman, supra n. 19.
2009
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the IRS ruling and Blackwater's tax evasion from Congress and law en-
forcement agencies. 57
VI. IRS SS-8 PROCEDURES
The procedure under which the guard requested the IRS to determine
his status began with an IRS Form SS-8.58 The form is a four-page ques-
tionnaire entitled "Determination of Employee Work Status for Purposes of
Federal Employment Taxes and Income Tax Withholding." 59 Either a
worker or a firm may complete a Form SS-8 and initiate the worker status
determination. Unlike many other IRS determinations, requesting a deter-
mination of worker status with a Form SS-8 does not require paying a fee. 60
The form requires information about the nature of the business, the
work performed, and any written agreement between the parties.61 It
probes a wide range of specific factors of control and independence, includ-
ing but not limited to training, reports, instrumentalities, investment, and
compensation. 62 After receiving the form and the information, the IRS as-
signs a technician to review the facts and apply the law to render a decision.
The IRS technician may require further information from the requestor
to make a determination. 63 Moreover, the IRS technician will seek input
from the other party (via another Form SS-8) in an attempt to more clearly
view the relationship. There is thus at least some attempt to solicit informa-
tion from the other side. However, a failure to provide a responding Form
SS-8 will not prevent the IRS from issuing a determination in the matter.
Instead, the IRS in such a case would make its determination based on the
information provided by the requestor.
After applying the law to the facts, the IRS issues a formal determina-
tion letter to the firm, with a copy sent to the worker. Such a determination
letter is binding upon the IRS with respect to income and employment
taxes, but it only applies to the worker or the class of workers for whom the
request was made. In some cases, such as for hypothetical worker status
determinations, the IRS will only issue a non-binding information letter. 64
A 2004 audit of the SS-8 process found that the three IRS sites
processing SS-8s for the fiscal year of 2003 made 5,960 worker status de-
57. Id.
58. See General Instructions, I.R.S Form SS-8 (last rev. Nov. 2006).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. General Instructions. I.R.S. Form SS-8 (last rev. Nov. 2006).
Vol. 70
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terminations. 65 Of the 3,377 determinations made at the two sites that were
still operating at the time of the report, 93% ended with the businesses and
workers accepting the decision. The remainder became the subject of re-
quests for reconsideration. Only 14 determinations were reversed on recon-
sideration. 66
The same audit report warned that the IRS was not adequately follow-
ing up on its own SS-8 determinations. That is, the IRS did not adequately
enforce the determinations or check taxpayer compliance. The report cau-
tioned that the SS-8 database was almost unusable to the examiners and
clerks, who could only access past determinations with the aid of a com-
puter programmer. The report also found that the IRS did not have ade-
quate procedures for quality review of the determinations. As a result of
these shortcomings, the audit found a lack of consistency in reaching deter-
minations. 67
VII. IRS 20-FACTOR DEFINITION
The 20 factors the IRS uses to classify workers have remained un-
changed for over two decades. 68 These factors reflect important considera-
tions in making the classification decision for federal tax purposes:
1. Instructions. The more instructions given to the worker, the more likely
employee status exists.
2. Training. The more training a person receives, the more likely he is an
employee.
3. Integration. The more closely integrated the work is with the em-
ployer's business, the more likely is employee status.
4. Services rendered personally. If the worker must personally do the
work, employee status is likely.
5. A person who hires, supervises, and pays assistants will often be an
independent contractor.
6. Continuing relationship. The longer the arrangement's term, the more
likely is employment status.
7. Set hours of work indicate employment status.
8. Working full-time indicates employment status.
9. Doing work on employer's premises suggests employment status.
10. Performing services in a particular order or sequence set suggests em-
ployment status.
11. Oral or written reports to an employer tend to suggest employee status.
65. Gordon C. Milbourn III, Acting Deputy Inspector General for Audit, U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment, Final Audit Report-The Program to Determine Worker Status for Federal Tax Purposes Needs
Expanded Goals and Increased Operational Oversight (audit # 200330020), reference number
2004-30-055 (Mar. 5, 2004) (available at http://www.treas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2004reports/
200430055fr.html).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296.
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12. Payment by the hour, week, or month suggests employment status.
13. Payment of business and traveling expenses suggests employment sta-
tus.
14. Furnishing of tools, materials, and other equipment suggests employ-
ment status.
15. A worker's significant investment tends to indicate independent contrac-
tor status.
16. A worker's potential to realize a profit or suffer a loss suggests indepen-
dent contractor status.
17. Working for more than one firm at a time suggests independent contrac-
tor status.
18. Making service available to the general public on a regular and consis-
tent basis suggests independent contractor status.
19. The right to discharge a worker suggests employment status.
20. A worker's right to terminate the relationship without incurring a liabil-
ity suggests employment status.
6 9
The IRS's 20-factor test has weathered some controversy over the last
decade. Various legislative proposals would have abolished or materially
modified the 20-factor test. However, those proposals have met little suc-
cess. For example, the Independent Contractor Tax Simplification Act was
introduced in 199670 to simplify and reduce the 20-factor test to three: 1) a
signed contract detailing the relationship as one of an independent contrac-
tor; 2) the worker having an investment in the business; and, 3) the worker
providing the instrumentalities of the business. This bill, which contained
more specific standards in the details, did not pass out of committee. For
the most part, it would simply have subsumed the 20 factors into three
larger factors.
Interestingly, the IRS itself has acknowledged that additional factors
may be important. 71 In fact, an IRS training course (for IRS employees) on
worker classification has stated that the primary test affecting worker status
is control. 72 IRS trainees are urged to look at several different categories of
evidence, which the IRS has divided into three primary areas. Those areas
are behavioral control, financial control, and the relationship of the parties.
These broad categories are sometimes viewed as more malleable and
therefore potentially more indicative of the real world than the 20 factors
enumerated in Revenue Ruling 87-41. Regardless of IRS attempts to sim-
plify and group factors, the fact remains that Revenue Ruling 87-41 is still
the law and reflects the IRS's classification methodology. Nonetheless,
69. Id. at 5-8.
70. Sen. 1610, Independent Contractor Tax Simplification Act of 1996, 104th Cong. (Mar. 13,
1996) (as introduced).
71. See I.R.S. Employnient Tax Handbook, I.R.S. Pub. No. 104, at § 5.81 (2007); see also Indepen-
dent Contractor or Employee? I.R.S. Pub. Training Materials No. 3320-102, TPDS 842381 (Oct. 30,
1996).
72. Id.
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many courts have moved away from express reliance on the IRS's 20 fac-
tors to a smaller number of factors grouped together.7 3
Although the mention of various tests may sound dizzying, much inde-
pendent-contractor-versus-employee analysis is almost intuitive, focusing
on the extent of control actually exercised or which could be exercised as a
matter of right. That is, the legal right to control a worker will usually
indicate an employment relationship, even if the employer chooses not to
exercise it. Each test seeks to ferret out the work arrangement's details to
determine worker status based on traditional indices.
VIII. SECTION 530 RELIEF
We may be coming full circle in worker status controversies. In the
1970s, after the IRS began to reclassify many independent contractors as
employees, many employers claimed the IRS was misapplying the rules and
that retroactive taxes could be devastating. In response, Congress provided
relief in Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978. 74 If the IRS reclassifies a
worker, it is required by the Internal Revenue Manual75 to inform the em-
ployer of the relief provisions under Section 530.
Section 530 provides that when an employer classifies a worker as an
independent contractor and the worker is later reclassified as an employee
during an audit, the employer may be sheltered from paying employment
taxes. The shelter requires the employer to 1) provide the appropriate tax
returns, including information returns; 2) prove that all similar workers
were consistently treated as non-employees; and, 3) show a reasonable basis
for the classification as an independent contractor. Congress intended Sec-
tion 530 to be interpreted liberally.
A reasonable basis for independent contractor treatment can be estab-
lished through any of three methods. Employers may cite precedent from
either the IRS or the courts treating similarly situated workers as indepen-
dent contractors. Similarly, if a past IRS audit failed to question worker
characterization, the audit itself equals reasonable basis. Longstanding in-
dustry practice is also acceptable as evidence of a reasonable basis. 76
Significantly, once a taxpayer cooperates with the IRS audit and makes
a prima facie showing of reasonable basis, the burden shifts to the IRS to
show taxpayer disentitlement to relief. In recent years, some observers
have suggested that Section 530 relief is too liberal, letting companies off
73. See Avis Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc. v. U.S., 503 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Leb's Enter. Inc. v.
U.S., 2000 WL 139551 (N.D. 111. Jan. 26, 2000).
74. Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978).
75. See generally I.R.S. Manual, http://www.irs.gov/irml (last accessed Dec. 22, 2008).
76. Avis, 503 F.2d at 429.
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the hook based on minimal criteria. Under this view, Section 530 may actu-
ally encourage employers to treat workers as independent contractors when
they should not be so treated. 77
IX. CONTRACTS AND CONTROVERSIES
Blackwater has experience with the independent-contractor-versus-em-
ployee issue in multiple disciplines. For example, in one case, Blackwater
was sued by the administrators of the estates of four Blackwater workers
killed in Iraq. 78 The dispute is an odd one, both substantively and procedur-
ally, and shows the linchpin status that worker status issues can have. The
complaint was filed in 2005. 79 The gravamen of the lawsuit is that Black-
water violated its own procedures, rules, and contractual commitments with
respect to the conduct of its security operations in Iraq, and that it thereby
caused the deaths of these four workers.
Interestingly, the complaint does not appear to hinge on the status of
the four decedents as either independent contractors or employees. The
lawsuit primarily attacks Blackwater's procedures and conduct, alleging nu-
merous egregious violations of its own contract and protocols. But it also
seeks rescission of Blackwater's contract with the decedents based on as-
serted fraud. Presumably the status of the decedents as common law em-
ployees of Blackwater will be an issue and could prove a very important
one.
The procedural scuffling in this case has also been interesting. Black-
water first sought removal of the case to federal district court and then
sought dismissal. The federal district court first concluded that removal
jurisdiction had not been established and that it could not dismiss the case,
remanding it back to a North Carolina state court. 80
Blackwater then sought review in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
with an ordinary appeal and also with a petition for a writ of mandamus.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Blackwater' s contentions, and
the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. 8'
Thereafter, Blackwater actually sued the families in a rare counter-
strike, seeking ten million dollars in damages. Ostensibly, the suit asserts
that the families breached their contract with Blackwater by filing the un-
77. Senator Barack Obama, S.2044 Would Reform Independent Contractor Classification, 2007
Tax Notes Today 180-268 (Sep. 17, 2007).
78. Nordan v. Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC, 382 F. Supp. 2d 801 (E.D.N.C. 2005).
79. See PL.'s Compl., http://www.blackwatervictims.com/pdfs/Complaint%20File%2OStamped.pdf
(Jan. 5, 2005).
80. Nordan, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 806.
81. In re Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC, 460 F.3d 576 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
1381 (2007).
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derlying lawsuit. 82 One goal of the suit appears to redirect the forum for all
of the claims into arbitration, where Blackwater claims it belongs under its
contract. 83 Arbitration would presumably be private, as Blackwater sug-
gests sensitive information would come to light in a public forum. Perhaps
more importantly, arbitration awards are traditionally more modest than
jury verdicts. Although the four families are represented by contingent-fee
attorneys in the lawsuit filed by the families, there is no contingent fee
arrangement available for defending a suit brought by someone else. 84 Ac-
cordingly, a legal defense fund has been established for the families, seek-
ing contributions for defense costs in the action filed by Blackwater. 85
As that drama unfolds, the plain, and by comparison pedestrian, exam-
ination of Blackwater's service contract is nevertheless telling. Blackwa-
ter's service contract is an 18-page, single-spaced form that requires the
contractor to fill in his name and address on page one and to provide his
signature on page 16.86 It is unclear whether such contracts are negotiable.
What is clear is that the contracts contain the following basic provisions:
" The basic duty is to serve as a "security team member, reporting directly
to any supervisor as may be designated by [Blackwater] or Customer from
time to time."
" Fees are payable on a daily basis, with lower rates for training and travel
days, and higher rates for deployment days.
" The location of the assignment is the "Duty Station" or such other location
directed by Blackwater or its Customer. The worker acknowledges that
the geographic location may change at any time.
" The term of the contract is generally three years, though it is subject to
extension or curtailment.
" The basic work schedule is 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, with work
.'scheduled at the sole discretion of [Blackwater] and the needs of Cus-
tomer."
" No taxes are withheld, and all travel expenses are considered taxable in-
come and thus appear on the worker's IRS Form 1099.
" Blackwater is responsible for economy-class air transportation to and from
the Duty Station.
" The worker is responsible for obeying U.S. and local laws, regulations,
and customs, and is required to maintain personal attire and hygiene in
accordance with Blackwater's or its Customer's policies.
82. Frequently Asked Questions, Blackwater Victims Defense Fund, http://
www.blackwatervictims.conml pdfs/FAQs.pdf (last accessed Dec. 22, 2008).
83. See Daniel Callahan, Families of American Contractors Slain in Iraq Seek Help from American
Public as They Are Attacked by Blackwater, http://blackwatervictims.com/pdfs/Blackwater%20Victims
%20Defense%20Fund.pdf (June 6, 2007).
84. Id.
85. Blackwater Defense Fund Website, http://www.blackwatervictims.com (last accessed Dec. 22,
2008).
86. Blackwater Security Consulting, supra n. 40, at 1, 16.
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" The worker is bound by a confidentiality covenant for the term of the
agreement and for five years thereafter.
" The worker is bound not to compete with or solicit other workers during
the term of the contract and for 18 months thereafter.
" Blackwater retains the right to terminate the contract "without notice at
any time, with or without cause, without advance notice for any reason or
no reason whatsoever." The worker is entitled to compensation for ser-
vices only provided up to the date and hour of discharge.
" The worker can terminate the contract only if Blackwater fails to pay him,
and even then, only if that pay is "undisputed."87
No single contract provision is critical in assessing worker status. An
independent contractor controversy is perhaps the quintessential example of
a facts-and-circumstances analysis. On a cursory examination, one would
assume that the worker is simply required to obey. This may be entirely
appropriate and even necessary in the face of wartime hostilities, given the
security duties required in troubled spots in the world. The question, how-
ever, is whether such military-like action and order-taking can conform to
the independent contractor model.
Security consultants are. required to take orders from whomever Black-
water appoints, or indeed, from the "Customer."88 Blackwater and the Cus-
tomer set all duty hours for personnel. The worker evidently lacks a right to
pick and choose which duties to perform. Moreover, the termination provi-
sions are entirely one-sided, with the worker having no rights whatsoever,
and Blackwater having unfettered termination rights.89
The analysis at this stage will be limited to a review of the contract and
not the actual conduct between the worker and the company. Even so, it is
difficult to read Blackwater's written agreement and to believe it would
stand up to scrutiny. That scrutiny could occur in a tax dispute, in a dispute
over workers' compensation insurance, in a wrongful death claim, in a re-
spondeat superior tort liability suit, in a labor or employment law dispute,
or in any other action involving worker classification.
X. TAX OBLIGATIONS
Blackwater receives more than $460 million a year from the State De-
partment for its security work worldwide. 90 Based on that figure, Represen-
tative Waxman's staff estimated Blackwater may have skirted over $30 mil-
lion in federal taxes.91 Moreover, that estimate merely covers the period
from May 2006 to March 2007, a period between the beginning of the U.S.
87. See generally Blackwater Security Consulting, supra n. 40.
88. Id. at 9.
89. Id. at HI.
90. Cole, supra n. 11.
91. Waxman, supra n. 19.
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contract with Blackwater and the IRS ruling. This estimate includes unpaid
Social Security, Medicare, unemployment, and related taxes. 92
Assuming that Blackwater has continued to treat its workers as inde-
pendent contractors since the March 2007 ruling, that number is estimated
to be almost $50 million in unpaid taxes through September 2007. 93 Pre-
sumably, if one were to reach back in time to May 2006 or to reach forward
from October 2007 to the current date, the tax savings in question would
multiply significantly. Of course, if Blackwater's worker characterization
is correct, no taxes are being inappropriately avoided.
Indeed, Blackwater contends it treats its security personnel as indepen-
dent contractors because its guards prefer this arrangement and because
Blackwater finds that "it is a model that works" for them. 94 Blackwater
believes its personnel prefer the flexibility an independent contractor rela-
tionship provides, allowing them to sign on for a certain period of time and
to schedule personal leave when convenient. 95
In a December 3, 2007, press release, Blackwater defended its inde-
pendent contractor classification for overseas security personnel, arguing
that it had complied with federal law. 96 Blackwater states that the treatment
of its security personnel falls within Section 530's safe haven.97 The com-
pany claims to have obtained the advice of qualified tax professionals from
a large accounting firm and from an unspecified law firm. It has argued
that this reliance gives a reasonable basis for designating the security per-
sonnel as independent contractors.98
The Blackwater press release also notes that the Small Business Ad-
ministration ("SBA") conducted its own independent inquiry into "whether
certain Blackwater security workers should be classified as independent
contractors" and determined that they were properly classified. 99 The SBA
applied its own standards, as well as criteria used by the IRS, to reach its
determination. While this argument is helpful, there has long been madden-
ing inconsistency across different bodies of law. 00
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 530, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978) (amended by Pub. L. No. 96-167, § 9, 93 Stat.
1278 (1979)); Pub. L. No. 96-541, § 1, 94 Stat. 3205 (1980); Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 269, 96 Stat. 324
(1982); Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1706, 100 Stat. 2596 (1986); Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1122, 110 Stat.
1900 (1996) [hereinafter "Section 530"].
98. Blackwater Worldwide, supra n. 30.
99. Id.
100. See McGuiggan v. CPC Intl. Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 470, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that
because the test applied under each law-Fair Labor Standards Act and Employee Retirement Income
Security Act-differed, the determination under ERISA's common law standard did not preclude hear-
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Blackwater attempted to discredit Representative Waxman's reliance
on the March 30, 2007, SS-8 Determination Letter, saying that it was unre-
liable and had little legal effect.' 0 1 Blackwater argued that these SS-8 de-
terminations may not be used or cited as precedent, are not published, and,
as they are not considered an examination, cannot be used to assess employ-
ment taxes.10 2 Blackwater asserted the Determination Letter was one-sided
and written without a full and open adversarial process.
Instead, Blackwater characterized the IRS determination as a mere re-
sponse to one individual, looking only at the facts provided by that individ-
ual. Blackwater also claimed that the SS-8 Determination Letter was re-
plete with "legal and factual errors." 10 3 According to Blackwater, the IRS
technician who wrote the letter did not apply Section 530, did not properly
apply the IRS's own training materials, and overlooked relevant case
law.104 The audit of the IRS's SS-8 process did find various problems in
that process. 10 5
XI. CONGRESSIONAL REACTION
Senator Kerry, the chair of the Senate Small Business and Entrepre-
neurship Committee, learned that Blackwater may be relying on the SBA
determination for tax reasons and wrote to the SBA on October 23, 2007.106
In his letter, Senator Kerry called on the SBA to explain its potential in-
volvement and requested notification of any determinations reached by the
SBA regarding Blackwater's workers. 0 7 Senator Kerry also requested that
the SBA specify whether those classifications had been made for tax pur-
poses. 108
The SBA responded by explaining its determination made on Novem-
ber 2, 2006, regarding Presidential Airways, a Blackwater affiliate. It found
that Blackwater's personnel were not employees "and therefore Presidential
Airways did not exceed the applicable size standard."' 1 9 The SBA pointed
ing of the FLSA claim under the "economic reality" test); Fredenburg v. Contra Costa Co. Dept. of
Health Servs., 172 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that due to the different definitions of disability
employed by that state and federal agencies, it is possible to qualify for disability benefits and to satisfy
the ADA's definition of a "qualified person with a disability," meaning a person who can perform
essential job functions with or without accommodations).
101. Blackwater worldwide, supra n. 30.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See supra nn. 64-66.
106. Kerry Requests Finance Investigation of Blackwater, supra n. 7.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. U.S. Small Business Administration, SBA says Blackwvater Determination not Applicable to Tax
Matters, 2007 Tax Notes Today 209-269 (Oct. 29, 2007).
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out they used IRS tax criteria in making the determination, but also ac-
knowledged that SBA's size determinations are "solely for purposes of as-
certaining eligibility for [its] small business programs" and do not pertain to
tax liability matters. 1 10
Senator Kerry followed up in a November 1, 2007, letter to the SBA,
stating that he needed additional information and documentation.111 Sena-
tor Kerry requested both a detailed accounting of the SBA's worker classifi-
cation ruling and any information not yet provided about size determina-
tions made for any Blackwater affiliates. 112
In an October 26, 2007, letter to Senate Finance Committee Chairs
Max Baucus and Charles Grassley, Senator Kerry requested that the Fi-
nance Committee investigate Blackwater to ascertain whether Blackwater
had misclassified workers to evade taxes. 113 Senator Kerry also sent a letter
to Erik Prince of Blackwater, questioning "why Blackwater relied on or
referenced an SBA size determination for classifying its workers for tax
purposes." He also requested any documents relating to the determination
and to Blackwater's classification of workers. 114 Additionally, Senator
Kerry requested an explanation of Blackwater's chain of command, and the
status of any audit the IRS may be conducting on Blackwater or its affili-
ates. ''
5
Senators Obama and Durbin sent a similar request to Treasury Secre-
tary Paulson on October 26, 2007, writing: "It is difficult to fathom how
Blackwater employees in Iraq can be considered independent contractors.
They are trained by Blackwater, paid by Blackwater, and told whom to
guard by Blackwater."' 16 The Senators also called on the Treasury Depart-
ment to reform the Section 530 provision to prevent similar situations from
continuing to arise.' 17
Obama's and Durbin's letter mentioned the Independent Contractor
Proper Classification Act of 2007, S.2044, which the Senators introduced
along with Senators Edward Kennedy and Patty Murray in September
2007.118 The bill would revise procedures for worker classification, prima-
rily focusing on Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978.119 The bill would
110. Id.
111. Senator John Kerry, Kerry Questions SBA Concerning Blackwater Contract Deals, 2007 Tax
Notes Today 214-242 (Nov. 5, 2007).
112. Id.
113. Kerry Requests Finance Investigation of Blackwater, supra n. 7.
114. Kerry Requests SBA-Related Documentation from Blackwater, supra n. 7.
115. Id.
116. Obama, supra n. 9.
117. Id.
118. S.2044 Would Reform Independent Contractor Classification, supra n. 77.
119. Section 530, supra n. 97.
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also encourage improved enforcement of existing tax and labor laws related
to worker misclassification, strengthen coordination between the Labor and
Treasury Departments, improve workers' access to information, and allow
workers to question their classifications without employer retaliation.120
XII. INDUSTRY STANDARDS
Blackwater is the largest private military contractor in Iraq, with over
600 security guards. Triple Canopy and DynCorp only have 73 and 77,
respectively.1 21 These other two companies also provide security services
to the State Department in Iraq and treat their guards as employees.' 22
Blackwater, however, classifies its 604 security guards and other personnel
in Iraq as independent contractors. 123
Historically, the IRS has held that security guards are employees for
federal employment tax purposes. 124 Although not precedential, IRS letter
rulings indicate how the IRS may treat similar situations.1 25 In Letter Rul-
ing 7843016, the IRS found security guards to be employees because the
company exercised overall control over the guards.1 26 Regardless of the
fact that the company denominated the security guards as independent con-
120. See also Robert W. Wood, Independent Contractor-Versus-Employee Issues Arise in Multiple
Contexts, 2007 BNA Daily Tax Rpt. J. 192 (Oct. 4, 2007).
121. Waxman, supra n. 19; Dept. of St., Fact Sheet: WPPSII Contracts Awarded to Blackwater,
Triple Canopy, and DynCorp (undated).
122. Waxman, supra n. 19.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., P.L.R. 7611242090A (Nov. 24, 1976), 1976 PLR LEXIS 248 (security guards for
company that sent guards out on different assignments); P.L.R. 8511041 (Dec. 17, 1984), 1984 PLR
LEXIS 268 (security guards that patrolled fairgrounds); P.L.R. 7747069 (Aug. 26, 1977), 1977 PLR
LEXIS 2035 (security guard who patrolled a marina); P.L.R. 8114021 (Dec. 24, 1980), 1980 PLR
LEXIS 6724 (security guards providing round-the-clock surveillance for various clients' premises);
P.L.R. 9251021 (Sept. 18, 1992), 1992 PLR LEXIS 1966 (security guards for a grocery store); P.L.R.
8614011 (Dec. 20, 1985), 1985 PLR LEXIS 70 (security guards at construction sites and office build-
ings); P.L.R. 8645015 (Aug. 6, 1986), 1986 PLR LEXIS 1826 (security guard at a real estate develop-
ment); P.L.R. 9418006 (Jan. 28, 1994), 1994 PLR LEXIS 171 (security guard at an amusement arcade);
P.L.R. 8645060 (Aug. 12, 1986), 1986 PLR LEXIS 1781 and P.L.R. 8623036 (Mar. 11, 1986), 1986
PLR LEXIS 3964 (security guard of property subdivision); P.L.R. 8338110 (June 22, 1983), 1983 PLR
LEXIS 3087 (security guard at automobile dealership); P.L.R. 8401014 (Sept. 26, 1983), 1983 PLR
LEXIS 1429 (security guard at coal mine); P.L.R. 7948006 (Aug. 15, 1979), 1979 PLR LEXIS 5270
(security guard at furniture store); P.L.R. 8130018 (Apr. 20, 1981), 1981 PLR LEXIS 3849 (security
guards at ski resort); P.L.R. 9140032 (June 28, 1991), 1991 PLR LEXIS 1424 (security guard at public
school); P.L.R. 8902021 (Oct. 14, 1988) 1988 PLR LEXIS 3104 (security guard at mental health
center). These rulings involve workers who were both hired by a security company that provides secur-
ity services to various businesses and then were sent out to different premises by the security company,
as well as security guards who were hired directly by the company that required the on-site security
services.
125. I.R.C. § 61 10(k)(3) (1976).
126. P.L.R. 7843016 (July 25, 1978), 1978 PLR LEXIS 2649.
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tractors, the IRS found that the company exercised sufficient control over
the workers to warrant an employer-employee relationship. 127
In Letter Ruling 7843016, the company arranged to provide "[s]ecurity
[g]uards to hospitals, hotels, and other businesses."' 128 The Letter Ruling
also stated: "Your Firm directs the individual [s]ecurity [g]uards as to
which of your clients to go to, to perform their services, pays them for their
services, and may terminate their services at any time."129 Furthermore, the
company maintained a "continuing arrangement" with the security guards
and had the "final right to determine whether the services" of the security
guard were acceptable.130
In Letter Ruling 7843016, the security guards received "specific in-
structions as to the manner and means of their services from the Firm (or
from a senior [s]ecurity [g]uard acting on behalf of the Firm)." 131 The
guards' services were "fully integrated into the company's business"' 132 and
were necessary to the company's function. The guards were essentially
full-time workers following the schedule and routine established by the
company. The guards "did not hold themselves out as available to perform
similar services" outside their agreement with the company.1 33 The guards
rendered their services personally and did not appoint helpers or assist-
ants. 13
4
The status of security guards has been examined in other contexts,
also. It has been queried under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 135
The FLSA applies minimum wage, overtime, equal pay, and child labor
protections to employees who are engaged in interstate commerce, involved
in producing goods for interstate commerce, or employed by an enterprise
engaged in interstate commerce. 136 Employees of private-sector employers,
state and local governments, and most federal agencies are all covered.' 37
For example, in Mitchell v. Strickland Transportation Co., the security
guards' relationship with the company was governed by individual con-
tracts that gave the guards the right to select substitutes when they could not
work, and the guards were responsible for paying the substitutes. 13  The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals still held that the security guards were em-
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id,
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. P.L.R, 7843016 (July 25, 1978).
133. Id.
134, Id.
135. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2008).
136. Id.
137. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203, 206, 207, 212.
138. Mitchell v. Strickland Transp. Co,, 228 F.2d 124 (5th Cir, 1955).
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ployees in this context. 139 The court reasoned that the guards were employ-
ees because they: (1) were not viewed as separate, independent businesses;
(2) regularly performed routine tasks that were part of the normal opera-
tions of the business; and, (3) often performed tasks similar to those per-
formed by other employees, such as safekeeping cargo.' 40
XIII. HISTORY LESSON
The classification of workers can be difficult and consequential. The
legal tests and the extent of the laws are vague and serve different purposes.
They are also enforced by different agencies, including the IRS, state unem-
ployment and workers' compensation agencies, insurance companies, and
the courts. These distinct decision-making bodies each use different crite-
ria, have different reasons for making decisions, and may reach different
decisions regarding the same working relationship. The controlling stan-
dard for most purposes, however, is the common law right-to-control stan-
dard. 14
Given the difficulty in defining control and the right to exercise it,
different approaches have evolved. For example, in United States v. Silk,
the Supreme Court determined that coal unloaders were employees rather
than independent contractors, even though they provided some of their own
tools and did not work on a regular basis. 142 The Court suggested criteria
for determining if an employee is integral to the employer's work, such as
whether the worker has an investment in the business and whether the
worker can sustain a profit or loss based upon their efforts. 43 These new
criteria became part of what is known as the "economic reality" test. 144
Congress was concerned with the economic reality test, as it could
include all workers and thus bring them all under the coverage of the Social
Security Act. 145 Even in the infancy of Social Security, lawmakers feared
that such extensive coverage would bankrupt Social Security. Therefore, in
the 1948 Gearhart Resolution, Congress expressed a preference for the
common law definition because of its apparent narrower approach. 46
139. Id. at 128.
140. Id. at 127.
141. See e.g. S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dept. of Indus. Rel., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 341 (Cal. 1989)
(California's Borello standard); Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 (IRS 20-Factor Test); Robert W.
Wood, Legal Guide to Independent Contractor Status (4th ed., Tax Institute 2007) (state-level ABC
tests).
142. U.S. v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947).
143. Id. at 716-718.
144. Id.
145. Pub. L. No. 80-655, 62 Stat. 438 (1948).
146. Id.
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However, Congress did not reject the Supreme Court's reasoning that eco-
nomic factors should be considered in making a determination. 47
Consequently, the courts have long been divided on how to interpret
these issues. Even today, there is no single statutory test for determining
whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor. The IRS
and a variety of state and federal agencies make their own determinations.
Thus consistency is not always possible because agencies use varying crite-
ria. A worker may be classified as an employee for one purpose and as a
contractor for another.
In some respects, Blackwater's situation reflects this multidisciplinary
inquiry, which interconnects seemingly disparate areas of the law. The
SBA found that certain Blackwater personnel were not employees. In de-
fending its decision, the SBA pointed out that its size determinations are
solely for purposes of ascertaining eligibility for its small business pro-
grams, and are not applicable to tax matters.' 48 The IRS could make a
different determination of the same workers for tax purposes.
These are consequential decisions. The classification of a worker de-
termines eligibility for federal unemployment, state workers' compensation,
and some pension and fringe benefit plans. A worker must be classified as
an employee to be eligible to bring a lawsuit under, for example, the Fair
Labor Standards Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, and the National Labor Relations Act. 149 These
labor laws are not uniform, and an analysis of the facts and circumstances
of each case is required.
XIV. THE ERA OF WORKER STATUS LITIGATION
AND VIZCAINO V. MICROSOFT
There has also been an increasing amount of private litigation in which
putative independent contractors sue companies claiming they are employ-
ees.' 50 Although one expects worker status controversies to occur with
government taxing or regulatory agencies, worker status controversies also
arise in civil litigation between private parties. Moreover, there appears to
be an increasing trend of civil litigation brought by workers who are con-
tractually labeled as "independent contractors." In many of these cases, the
workers sue their employer expressly seeking reclassification. Some em-
147. Id.
148. Waxman, supra n. 19.
149. See generally Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219; Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2000(e)(17); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634; National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
150. See Tracey A. Cullen, The Independent Contractor Snarl, Newsltr. of N.Y. Empl. Law Ltr.
(June 6, 2008) (available at http://www.hrhero.com/hl/060608-lead-independent.html).
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ployers are startled to learn that a written contract with an independent con-
tractor that clearly identifies the worker as an "independent contractor" may
not be respected by the courts.
Indeed, one could argue that a worker who signs a contract stating that
he is an independent contractor should be estopped from later claiming that
he is, in fact, an employee. However, following the overriding notion that
the true relationship of the parties and the true practice between the worker
and the company will control the worker status question, mere words in a
contract may not prove determinative. In part, this merely reflects that the
worker status determination generally must take into account the totality of
the situation. Some courts have discounted written contracts even more
readily when the facts suggest that they were "adhesion" contracts signed
by unsophisticated workers with no bargaining power as to the terms of the
contract. Even though a contract may identify a worker as an independent
contractor, courts often analyze the facts and circumstances surrounding the
relationship. The courts assess the contract's language and the pattern of
practice between the worker and the employer to assess the worker's true
status. The contract is only one piece of evidence that a court will evaluate
to determine whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor.
Although it was not the first such case, the cornerstone of the modem
era of worker status litigation is Vizcaino v. Microsoft.15 1 In that case, a
group of freelance workers sued Microsoft, claiming they, as common law
employees, were entitled to various savings benefits under Microsoft's Sav-
ings Plus Plan (SPP) and to stock-option benefits under Microsoft's Em-
ployee Stock Purchase Plan (ESPP).152 The freelancers were hired with the
distinct understanding that they would not receive the same benefits given
to Microsoft's regular employees. 153 They were paid through the accounts-
receivable department, instead of the payroll department. 154 They were also
paid at a higher hourly rate than comparable regular employees. 155
Microsoft presumably assumed there was no risk of reclassification.
However, in prior years, the IRS examined Microsoft's employment
records and determined that Microsoft's freelancers were not independent
contractors but employees for withholding and employment tax pur-
poses. 156 Thus Microsoft was required to pay withholding taxes and the
employer's portion of the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA)
151. Vizcaino v. Microsoft, 97 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1996), reh'g en banc granted, 105 F.3d 1334 (9th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1098 (1998).
152, Id. at 1189.
153. Id. at 1190.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1202.
156. Id. at 1190.
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tax. 157 In determining that the freelancers were really employees, the IRS
concluded that Microsoft either exercised or retained the right to exercise
direction over the services performed by the freelancers. 158
Upon learning of the IRS rulings, the freelancers sought various em-
ployee benefits including SPP and ESPP benefits.159 Microsoft denied the
freelancers' claims for benefits, taking the position that the freelancers were
independent contractors and thus not eligible for employee benefits. 160
Microsoft's plan administrator also reviewed and denied the claims, deter-
mining that the freelancers had contractually waived any rights to benefits
and that the freelancers were not "regular, full time employees."' 161
The district court concluded that the freelancers were not eligible for
SPP benefits because the SPP restricted participation to individuals on
Microsoft's payroll, and the freelancers were not paid through the payroll
department. 162 The district court also concluded that the freelancers were
not eligible to participate in the ESPP because the contract between
Microsoft and the freelancers clearly stated the freelancers were not eligible
to receive benefits. Furthermore, the freelancers had no expectation that
they would receive ESPP benefits. 163
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case, holding that the
freelancers were eligible to receive both SPP and ESPP benefits. 164 The
SPP provided that each common law employee who was 18 years or older
and who was on the United States payroll was eligible to participate in the
SPP. 165 The court ruled that the freelancers met these requirements. 166
The court also ruled that by incorporating Internal Revenue Code Sec-
tion 423 into the provisions of the ESPP, Microsoft "manifested an objec-
tive intent" to make all common law employees, including the freelancers,
eligible for participation in the plan. 167 Of importance, Microsoft conceded
the freelancers were common law employees and contested their lawsuit on
other grounds. The court also noted that Microsoft, as drafter of the SPP,
could have easily limited participation in the SPP by using more explicit
language in the plan's provisions. 168
157. Vizcaino, 97 F.3d at 1190.
158. Id. at 1191.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162, Id. at 1192.
163. Vizcaino, 97 F.3d at 1192.
164. Id, at 1200.
165. Id. at 1192.
166. Id. at 1196.
167. Id. at 1197,
168. Id, at 1196.
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Vizcaino demonstrates that employers cannot rely entirely upon the la-
bels placed in contracts to designate a worker as an independent contractor.
The denomination that a worker is an independent contractor in the contract
is not sufficient to establish an independent contractor relationship. 169 The
status of the relationship, not the contract, will ultimately control the out-
come.
Vizcaino also nicely demonstrates the nearly inevitable interaction be-
tween tax controversies and other worker status inquiries. The IRS's
reclassification most likely induced the freelancers to make their claim in
Vizcaino. A later reclassification controversy may emanate from a simple
worker's compensation claim, and one tax-driven dispute over worker sta-
tus may come on the heels of another. State taxing authorities may follow
federal authorities or vice versa. A state employment development audit
may incite a direct suit by workers seeking recognition as employees.
Even public agencies are not immune from private litigation resulting
from the misclassification of workers. In Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,170 the plain-
tiffs were workers hired through private labor suppliers to work on long-
term projects for the water district. They sought relief to compel the water
district to enroll the workers in the California Public Employees Retirement
System (CalPERS). The workers had been labeled as "consultants" or
"agency temporary employees."1 7 1 The California Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment of the lower court, finding that the Public Employee's Retire-
ment Law required the water district to enroll all common law employees,
excluding only a few statutorily defined exceptions, into CalPERS.1 72
Class action lawsuits involving worker status are becoming more com-
mon. For example, in Estrada v. FedEx Ground,173 the plaintiffs were
pickup and delivery drivers classified as independent contractors in con-
tracts they signed with FedEx Ground. The plaintiffs sought to be classified
as employees,1 74 and the court held they were employees. In making this
determination, the court found most significant FedEx's right to control and
its exercise of that right. 175 The court noted that "the label placed by the
169. See S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d at 349 (holding that cucumber farm laborers contrac-
tually classified as "independent contractors" were, in fact, common-law employees covered under Cali-
fornia's Worker's Compensation Act).
170. Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. Super. Ct. of L.A. Co., 84 P.3d 966 (Cal. 2004).
171. Id. at 969.
172. Id. at 977.
173. Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys.. Inc. 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327 (Cal. App. 2007).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 4.
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parties on their relationship is not dispositive, and subterfuges are not coun-
tenanced." 1 76
In Estrada, the court stated:
As to whether or not the parties believed they were creating an employer-
employee relationship it would seem that the [drivers] thought they were ei-
ther investing in a 'job' or believed that they would be independent contrac-
tors, only to find out by reason of the [company's] controls that they were
being treated like employees. 177
Thus a court will not allow an employer to call a worker an "independent
contractor" while still subjecting him to the control it exercises over a nor-
mal employee.
XV. PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION
Most of these worker classification suits are brought as claims for em-
ployee benefits under state or federal law. In some cases, courts have been
reluctant to grant private rights of action where the statute in question does
not expressly grant individuals a private right of action on a worker mis-
classification issue. For example, in McDonald v. Southern Farm Bureau
Life Insurance Company,1 7 8 the Eleventh Circuit upheld a district court rul-
ing that individuals have no private right of action under FICA to seek
damages from their employer resulting from the employer's misclassifica-
tion of them as employees rather than independent contractors.
This case again illustrates the many reasons why the worker status
designation can prove critical. Beginning in 1989, and ending in 1998,
Craig McDonald was employed as an insurance agent by Southern Farm
Bureau Life Insurance Company. According to his federal class-action law-
suit, Sothern Farm Bureau Life erroneously misclassified McDonald as an
independent contractor for employment tax purposes. This caused McDon-
ald to be liable for applicable self-employment taxes. 179
McDonald alleged that, even though he and Southern Farm Bureau
Life entered a signed agreement labeling him an independent contractor, he
was an employee for the following reasons: (1) Southern Farm Bureau Life
exercised substantial control over his daily activities-including mandating
he keep certain hours of business; (2) Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance
Co. provided him with an office and a staff; and (3) Southern Farm Bureau
Life Insurance Co. controlled the circumstances and manner in which Mc-
Donald sold its products. 180
176. Id. at 22.
177. Id. at 21.
178. McDonald v. S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 291 F.3d 718 (11th Cir. 2002).
179. Id. at 721.
180. Id.
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Southern Farm Bureau Life moved the district court for summary
judgment, asserting that no private right of action existed under FICA that
would allow McDonald's claim. The district court granted the motion. In
explaining its decision, the court cited Cort v. Ash, 181 which established a
four-part test for "determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a
statute not expressly providing one": 182
(1) Does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?
(2) Is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to
create such a remedy or deny one?
(3) Is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to
imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?
(4) Is the cause of action one traditionally regulated to state law, in an area
basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to
infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? 183
The court went on to say that the pertinent inquiry in applying the Cort
analysis to McDonald's claim was "whether Congress intended to create,
either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action."' 84 It ex-
pounded:
[L]ike substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal
law must be created by Congress. The judicial task is to interpret the statute
Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not
just a private right but also a private remedy.' 85
When conducting this analysis, "statutory intent ... is determinative. With-
out it, a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no
matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible
with the statute." 86
The court concluded, "An analysis of the Cort factors makes it abun-
dantly clear that no private cause of action might be implied from the lan-
guage, structure, or legislative history of FICA."' 187
Notwithstanding these nuances, there are suggestions that worker sta-
tus litigation will continue to evolve. If anything, the stakes are likely to
increase. Companies facing worker status issues at any level should con-
sider the larger ramifications, since one dispute may serve as a catalyst to
another.
181. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
182. McDonald, 291 F.3d at 722.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 723.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 720.
187. Id.
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XVI. CONCLUSION
Blackwater's fate with respect to its worker classification issues re-
mains uncertain. The IRS may choose to examine other Blackwater em-
ployees piecemeal or may investigate the company's entire workforce, both
at home and abroad. If the IRS determines that Blackwater's foreign-based
security personnel are employees, Blackwater could fight back by request-
ing a redetermination or a private letter ruling, or by filing an administrative
appeal.
Moreover, joining the ranks of ever-growing numbers of private suits
on worker characterization issues, Blackwater's security personnel could
sue the company, claiming business expense reimbursement, fringe bene-
fits, pension and other qualified plan benefits, or other protections under
federal and state labor and employment laws. With the benefit of only a
cursory review of Blackwater's service contract, a reasonable initial reac-
tion to Blackwater's situation is that those arguing for employee status-
whether that is the government or the workers themselves-may have the
better arguments.
In addition, if the on-the-ground experience between Blackwater and
its security personnel reflects an even tighter grip of control by Blackwater
over the method, manner, and means by which its security personnel oper-
ate-that is, if Blackwater actually exerts even more control than its service
contract provides-then Blackwater's argument may prove even weaker.
Conversely, if Blackwater can demonstrate the kind of professionalism, in-
dependence, and end-result discretion that traditionally characterizes an in-
dependent contractor, Blackwater could prevail, even with an ambiguous
contract possibly suggesting otherwise.
If a dispute over the status of the security guards arises with the IRS
rather than with third-party workers, there is an additional protection. As
long as Section 530 relief remains available, even if Blackwater loses a
battle with the IRS, the consequences may not be too severe. Of course, the
pending Independent Contractor Proper Classification Act of 2007, if
passed, may make Section 530 relief tougher to obtain.' 8 8 For now, how-
ever, Section 530 relief remains an important failsafe with respect to IRS
liabilities. 189
188. Sen. 2044, Independent Contractor Proper Classification Act of 2007, supra n. 8.
189. See e.g. Peno Trucking, Inc. v. Conmmr., 2008 WL 4463765 (6th Cir. 2008) regarding: (1) the
IRS's reclassification of truck drivers as employees; and (2) the Tax Court's determination that the
company was not entitled to relief under Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978. The Tax Court
evaluated the drivers' status using the seven factors enunciated in Weber v. Commr., 60 F.3d 1104, 1110
(4th Cir. 1995). The court found all seven of the factors weighed in favor of classifying the truck drivers
as employees. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court's reclassification of the drivers. The
second issue was whether the company had a reasonable belief. Here, although there were state work-
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Perhaps Blackwater can provide dramatic evidence of a lack of control
over its security personnel. Perhaps it can show that these workers them-
selves exercise an enormous degree of independence. Such facts would
seem to be squarely at odds with the contracts Blackwater requires the
guards to sign, but perhaps Blackwater can nevertheless show that some-
how it does not exercise-and somehow it does not even have the legal
right to exercise-control.
That will be a tall order, perhaps an impossible mission in view of the
contract itself. Moreover, Blackwater may find that its worker status con-
troversies are increasingly multi-jurisdictional and multi-faceted. They can
involve the IRS, insurance companies, state and federal labor and employ-
ment authorities, private lawsuits with third parties (seeking respondeat su-
perior liability), and private lawsuits with the workers themselves. Even if
Blackwater has a better case than a review of its contract suggests, it seems
likely to be an expensive and protracted engagement.
ers' compensation rulings that two of the company's drivers were independent contractors for purposes
of workers' compensation. the Tax Court found the company did not have a reasonable basis for its
treatment. Overturning the Tax Court on this point, the Sixth Circuit noted that the state agencies
employed a 20-factor common-law test virtually identical to the test used by the IRS. Therefore, the
Court of Appeals found the company could reasonably rely on those determinations.
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